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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of investor protection legislation on foreign shareholders and bond-
holders. We nd, not surprisingly, a positive "direct" e¤ect of investor protection laws: foreign stock and
bond investments are encouraged by legislation that better protects, respectively, shareholder and credi-
tor rights. However, di¤erent investor classes are endowed with di¤erent rights, and conicting interests
among them can make strong protections a¤orded to one party detrimental to another. Indeed, we nd
that investor protection laws have signicant and sizeable "cross" e¤ects on foreign portfolio investment
and that the direction of these e¤ects is fully consistent with the conjecture that foreign stakeholders
are relatively more sensitive to the perceived riskiness of assets than domestic investors. Specically, we
nd that strong protection of creditor rights  limiting excessive risk taking positively a¤ects foreign
shareholders, whereas strong protection of shareholder rights potentially shifting a rm toward riskier
projects has a negative impact on foreign bondholders. The immediate policy implication of our ndings
is that strengthening investor protection rights is not a universally desirable policy. More specically,
accounting for the interaction of conicting corporate governance mechanisms is critical to the design of
regulatory policies and strategies aimed toward enhancement of inward foreign investment.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the role of corporate governance in cross-border investment. The emphasis on foreign
investment is driven by evidence that international diversication is benecial to investors despite increased
nancial market integration and systemic crises (Levy and Sarnat (1970); Santis and Gerard (1997); Das and
Uppal (2004)). In this respect, corporate governance, with its peculiar role of facilitating access to external
nance through reduction of information asymmetry (La Porta et al. (1998); LLSV (1998) henceforth), can
be critical in attracting foreign portfolio investment, which is indeed particularly sensitive to information
barriers.
Standard asset pricing models using a representative agent predict that di¤erences in investor rights and
nancial development should be capitalized in share prices such that investing in any given nations stocks
will be a fair investment regardless of that nations level of investor protection (Dahlquist et al. (2003)).
However, the prevalence of disproportionate investment in domestic assets the so-called "home bias" puzzle
can be read as evidence of the asymmetric perception of asset characteristics by home and foreign investors
thus breaking the representative agent hypothesis (Gehrig (1993); Kang and Stulz (1997)).
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) and Kang and Stulz (1997) emphasize that large, nancially solid, well-
known rms are preferred by foreigners, thereby underlining the asymmetry between resident and foreigner
investors. Chan et al. (2005) investigate the determinants of foreign and domestic investment, nding that
familiarity and variables capturing investment barriers have a signicant but asymmetric e¤ect on domestic
and foreign bias1 . These ndings are consistent with the conjecture that foreign investors are more vulnerable
to information asymmetry than domestic investors; hence, we claim that they might be more inuenced by
governance rules that reduce information costs.
Whenever the representative agent hypothesis is challenged, asset prices inevitably disclose only the
average e¤ect of investor protection legislation on investors as a whole. In this work, we are interested in the
impact of investor protection laws on stock and bond portfolios held by foreign investors2 . This e¤ect cannot
be observed directly from market price or total market capitalization, since these indicators capture only
the aggregate equilibrium behavior. Previous work originating from LLSV (1998) underlines how investor
protection a¤ects nancial market development, that is, the supply of equity, leaving the demand side mostly
1The same foreign-domestic asymmetry is found in Guiso et al. (2009), where domestic investors rank their own managers
higher than do foreign investors.
2We ignore any direct explanation relative to the home bias phenomenon and focus on the determinants of foreign positions.
However, domestic positions, though not explicitly investigated here, impact our analysis indirectly: the weight of each foreign
stock index in the overall portfolio also depends on the domestic share. See Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) for a discussion of
the implications of minority investor rights on home equity bias.
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unexplored. This latter perspective is relevant insofar as we account for heterogeneity across investors. For
instance, Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) show that investor protection impacts nancial market development
by inuencing the demand for equity, because di¤erent classes of investor can di¤er in the benets accruing
to them and therefore in their willingness to pay for stocks. Specically, controlling shareholders can gain
access to both private and security benets and thus be willing to pay more for a stock than investors who
can enjoy only security benets. These authors theoretical model provides several testable implications
with respect to home bias and stock market participation rates. However, they assume that domestic and
foreign outside investors face the same cost of participation in both domestic and foreign markets. This
hypothesis is quite strong and admittedly at odds with the prolic empirical literature emphasizing the role
of asymmetric information as a potential explanation for the home bias puzzle. Our perspective can be
viewed as complementary to Giannetti and Koskinen (2010): while they split the universe of investors into
inside and outside investors we focus on outside investors only, in order to test whether corporate governance
evenly a¤ects all portfolio investors or whether it is particularly relevant to foreign investors.
Our main contribution to the literature is twofold: on the one hand we estimate the e¤ect of investor
protection laws on foreign portfolio investment debt and equity portfolios; on the other hand we test for the
interaction of various governance mechanisms on stakeholders endowed with di¤erent rights and interests.
In fact, any analysis of the e¤ects of investor protection laws should carefully account for the conicting
interests of the various stakeholder groups. Within the corporation, the distinct interests of managers,
stockholders and creditors coexist and are often in conict with one another. It may be the case that legislation
particularly favorable to one type of stakeholder turns out to be detrimental to others. Shareholder-manager
conict has received much attention in the literature, but important sources of conict can also arise between
shareholders and bondholders. The corporate governance literature has analyzed the complex mechanisms
of conicts of interest between shareholders and creditors, suggesting that the potential conict between
equity and debt claimants lies primarily in wealth expropriation and risk shifting (Jensen and Meckling
(1976)). These conicts can give rise to interesting e¤ects on portfolio decisions making on the part of
foreign investors. Specically, strong shareholder rights protection are likely to benet foreign shareholders
("direct" e¤ect) but may also deter foreign bondholders ("cross" e¤ect) as shareholders are more prone to
risk-taking activities than is optimal for creditors (Myers (1977); Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Creditors
might indeed be more in line with managers, who may be more concerned with their own job security and so
choose to undertake less risky projects. On the other hand, strong creditor rights are likely to attract foreign
bondholders ("direct" e¤ect) but may deter stock investments ("cross" e¤ect) if rms are induced to engage
in risk-reducing processes such as acquisitions that are likely to be value-destroying (Acharya et al. (2008)).
Ultimately, the question of the impact of investor protection provisions on foreign stakeholders, the focus of
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the present paper, is an empirical one and depends on foreignersperception of the balance among various
interests. Our results highlight that laws protecting the interests of di¤erent types of investors asymmetrically
a¤ect foreign stakeholders and, more specically, that foreign portfolio investors more highly value corporate
governance practices that are risk-reducing than do domestic investors. Foreign shareholders appear to
appreciate strong creditor rights that potentially mitigate the riskiness of projects, while bondholders are
negatively a¤ected by strong shareholder rights that could induce the rm especially if it is highly leveraged
to engage in risky asset investments.
Finally, our ndings also contribute to the literature that investigates the failure of convergence in investor
protection legislation. Djankov et al. (2008) nd no convergence in creditor rights scores. La Porta et al.
(2000) reject the hypothesis of legal convergence of rules and enforcement mechanisms toward some successful
standard of e¤ective investor protection. These authors claim that this is due to the dominance of interest
group politics: extensive legal, regulatory and judicial reform are needed but governments are reluctant, as
the rst order e¤ect is a tax on insiders. Mansi et al. (2009) critically discuss the evidence of no polarization
toward a system of stronger or weaker investment protection: countries compete also on legal dimensions
in terms of their e¤ectiveness in attracting investment. However, competition does not necessarily induce a
"race to the bottom" or a "race to the top". Firms, in fact, sort themselves either away from binding payout
restrictions that reduce nancial exibility and value, or toward greater restrictions that reduce debt nancing
costs. Not all jurisdictions then need or should converge to the single best or worst alternative. Rather, the
existence of a variety of jurisdictions and di¤erent economic environments allows rms to maximize value by
choosing a set of laws most appropriate to their own situation. Our ndings contribute to this debate by
providing an indirect explanation for the evidence of no convergence toward the strongest investor protection
setting: investor protection can be benecial to one type of investor and detrimental to another. Accordingly,
the level of investor protection in each country is endogenously determined by many conicting forces, among
which are the political choice to promote inward investment and to favour some classes of investor over others.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After describing the conceptual framework and its
main implications in Section 2, we present our empirical analysis in Section 3, describing the econometric
setting, the data and the results. Section 4 summarizes the main ndings and addresses the potential policy
implications of our analysis.
2 A conceptual framework
Our theoretical framework relies on equilibrium portfolio allocations in which investors are supposed to face
di¤erent costs from investing in various nancial markets. According to Gehrig (1993), foreign investments
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appear on average more risky to domestic investors leading to an information-based justication to home
bias  and portfolios di¤er among investors depending on the perceived variance-covariance matrix. We
adopt this approach, shifting the focus to foreign investment exclusively, considering a di¤erent investor-
specic perceived variability of return for each foreign index in the investment opportunity set. Details on
the derivation of the model are provided in Appendix A. In the model, the "unbiased" portfolio holding of
an asset depends, as in standard portfolio choice theory, on asset characteristics (risk and return). When
considering equilibrium asset holdings without investment barriers, all investors ought to hold the same
portfolio (value-weighted portfolio) in which each asset is weighted according to its stock market capitalization
(MS). Importantly, the same portfolio is universally optimal in equilibrium even in the presence of investment
barriers, provided that these barriers identically a¤ect all investors. Conversely, heterogeneity in bilateral-
specic investment barriers generates a wedge between the investor-specic portfolio and the value-weighted
portfolio. This wedge depends, in particular, on how far the bilateral investment barrier of country l investing
in country j is from the average barrier of all countries investing in the same asset j. Denoting by Dlj the
relative (to world average) investment barrier of country l investing in asset j, the optimal portfolio weight
in asset j (wlj) by country l is
wlj =
1
Dlj
MSj (1)
where MSj is the market share of asset j in the world market capitalization and
1
Dlj
represents the relative
(with respect to world average) "advantage" of country l investing in asset j. In other words, this variable
captures the inverse of the investors relative (to world average) investment barriers (direct barriers, such as
transaction costs, or indirect ones, such as information barriers) in holding asset j: an investor residing in
country l will demand a share of asset j greater than its market share in proportion to
1
Dlj
(inverse of the
relative investment cost).3
By taking the logs of the above expression we obtain
log

wlj
MSj

= log

1
Dlj

(2)
The ratio wljMSj can be interpreted as the bilateral bias in asset j by a representative investor in country
l. If the actual position wlj is larger than js market share, then there is a positive bias, while a ratio lower
than 1 reveals a negative bias. The above relation implies that the bias in asset j by investors residing in
country l depends on the reciprocal of the bilateral-specic investment barrier relative to the world average
3Note that if Dlj = 1, i.e., if the investment barrier for country l in country j is equal to the average, then the market share
of asset j is optimally held in equilibrium.
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investment barrier. In other words, the larger the bilateral-specic investment barrier relative to the world
average, the lower the actual position in a given asset4 . In our analysis, the risky assets can be either stocks
or bonds, as the risk-free asset is determined in the model as the residual portfolio share.
2.1 Estimable equation and testable implications
To estimate (2) we must provide an empirical counterpart to the variableDlj , which is not directly observable.
Our nal estimable regression is as follows
log
 
wklj
MSkj
!
= k +
X
i=1;::;I
k;i log(Xilj) +
X
n=1;::;N
k;nY nlj +
X
h=1;::;H
k;h log(Zhj ) + "
k
lj (3)
where the superscript k = B;S identies bonds (B) or stocks (S).
All equilibrium factors, that is factors that are common to all investors, domestic and foreign, are captured
on the left-hand side by market share (MS), which is jointly determined with the market price in equilibrium.
In the presence of heterogeneity in the perception of asset variability, the asset price reveals the average
perceived variability. Any di¤erence between foreign and domestic portfolio investors in the perception of
this same factor can create a wedge between the actual position (w) and market share.
We consider i proxies, denoted by Xlj and n dummy variables Ylj which might, a priori, capture bilateral
investment barriers. If we consider, for instance, the distance between country l and j as an indicator
of investment cost, we expect a negative sign for the associated  coe¢ cient: a higher "relative proxy"
(e.g., greater distance between investing country l and target country j with respect to average distance) is
associated with investor l biasing her portfolio away from country j stocks5 . The main variable of interest
in this paper is investor protection laws, a destination-country-specic variable (Zj) and is included in our
specication since it may represent a potential device to overcome information barriers for foreign investors.
Since total market capitalization in any country must be held in equilibrium by some investors, a country
cannot be underweighted by all investors. This implies that a country-specic variable can a¤ect foreign
holdings only if this variable is di¤erently weighted by domestic and foreign investors6 . Indeed, if a country-
specic variable h equally a¤ected all investors in the economy, foreign and domestic ones, its coe¢ cient h
4Our theoretical framework is equivalent to the Chan et al. (2005) and Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) return-reducing approach.
In fact, at equilibrium, what matters is the investment barrier relative to the average investment barrier. In our approach
investment barriers enter in a multiplicative way, making our equation conveniently implementable and interpretable in log
terms.
5Note that all variables that capture bilateral investment barriers enter our specication in relative terms, i.e., relative to the
average world investment barrier.
6Note that when checking for the robustness of our results, we account for the fact that market share also comprises closely
held shares that are not available for portfolio investment. Therefore, we modify the measure of the total asset supply following
Dahlquist et al. (2003), and our ndings still hold. Moreover, by including investing country xed e¤ects we also partially control
for di¤erent degrees in investor protections across investing countries that Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) address as potential
drivers of home bias.
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ought to be null since the equilibrium asset price should fully incorporate any asset-specic characteristic
(Dahlquist et al. (2003)).
Since we are interested in testing the direct and cross e¤ects of investor protection laws on di¤erent types
of stakeholders shareholders and bondholders we need to estimate (3) for stock portfolios (3a) and bond
portfolios (3b) separately.
log
 
wSlj
MSSj
!
= S+
X
i=1;::;I
S;i log(Xilj)+
X
n=1;::;N
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log
 
wBlj
MSBj
!
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B+
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i=1;::;I
B;i log(Xilj)+
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(3b)
To estimate the above parameters, we adopt a feasible Generalized Least Squares specication that
assumes the presence of cross-section heteroskedasticity and that includes xed e¤ects for investing countries,
time dummies, and cross-section weight correction of the variance-covariance matrix7 .
We keep the variables that capture shareholder rights (sh_r) and creditor rights (cr_r) out of the pool
of destination-specic variables Zhj in order to separately discuss their e¤ect on the dependent variable. We
label as a "direct" e¤ect the impact of corporate rules on "target" investors, i.e., of shareholder (creditor)
rights on shareholders (bondholders); this is measured by S (B). We expect these coe¢ cients to be positive;
that is, we expect foreign stock (bond) investment to be enhanced by stronger shareholder (creditor) rights
 S (B) > 0: We label as a "cross" e¤ect the impact of corporate rules on "non-target" investors, i.e.,
creditor (shareholder) rights on shareholders (bondholders); this is measured by S (B).
Our setting allows us to directly test two main implications.
The rst generally addresses the issue of the di¤erent role played by corporate governance rules with
respect to foreign versus domestic investors. If the direct e¤ect of investor protection rights (sh_r and cr_r)
were the same for all portfolio investors in the market, domestic and foreign, we should nd that the null
hypothesis
1. H0 : S = 0 ^ B = 0
is not rejected, that is, we should nd no e¤ect on foreign investment since high or low protection should
be priced by the market (Dahlquist et al. (2003)).
7As an alternative, we have also run a Pooled OLS regression with xed e¤ect for investing countries, time dummies and
White correction of the variance-covariance matrix. Our ndings remain una¤ected under this alternative specication.
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Since bilateral portfolio bias is explained by relative (to average) investment barriers, the coe¢ cients
S and B attached to the investor protection variables are di¤erent from zero only if the impact of this
variable on the investors considered, i.e., foreign investors, di¤ers from the impact on domestic investors, and
therefore from the average impact that determines the equilibrium price. Conversely, a signicant coe¢ cient of
country-level investor protection laws for foreign investors can be read as a signal of the asymmetric impact
of corporate governance on foreign and domestic investors. In particular, evidence of positive (negative)
coe¢ cients of investor protection rights on foreign portfolio positions can be interpreted as better corporate
governance rules in a particular country fostering (deterring) inward investment.
The second testable hypothesis concerns more specically the policy implications of the cross e¤ect of
investor protection on foreign investors. Specically:
2a. if S > 0 ^ B > 0 (positive cross e¤ect), then strengthening investor protection is always a desirable
policy to attract foreign investments, and policies leading to stronger investor protection should be
encouraged without reservation;
2b. if S < 0 ^ B < 0 (negative cross e¤ect), then a systematic trade-o¤ between direct and cross e¤ects
exists and policies aimed to strengthen investor protection are not necessarily universally optimal;
2c. if S < 0 ^ B > 0 or S > 0 ^ B < 0; then the trade-o¤ exists for only one type of investor protection
legislation and policies need to be designed accordingly.
Let us assume that the rst hypothesis is not rejected, i.e., direct e¤ects are always positive, and let us
focus on cross e¤ects. If investor protection laws were benecial for all foreign stakeholders both bondholders
and shareholders we should observe an unconditionally positive impact of creditor and shareholder rights on
foreign portfolio investments (hypothesis 2a) such that stronger investor protection rights would be universally
advisable to increase inward investment. Conversely, if cross-e¤ects were systematically negative (hypothesis
2b) there would be a trade-o¤ between the e¤ect of corporate rules on "target" investors (e.g., shareholder
rights rules on shareholders) and on "non-target" investors (e.g., shareholder rights rules on bondholders),
and both types of investor protection rules would have to be carefully gauged to account for the trade-
o¤ between direct and cross e¤ects. Finally, we might observe a trade-o¤ between direct and cross e¤ects
holding exclusively for one type of investor protection (hypothesis 2c). If S < 0 ^ B > 0, then foreign
shareholders should be negatively a¤ected by strong creditor rights, since these can result in value-destroying
processes such as mergers and acquisitions (Acharya et al. (2008)); the positive impact of shareholder rights
on bondholders is less economically interpretable since bondholders have a quite low upside potential from
riskier projects. Finally, the set of parameter estimates S > 0 ^ B < 0 would instead reveal that creditor
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rights positively a¤ect foreign shareholders and shareholder rights negatively inuence foreign bondholders.
The last joint hypothesis is not rejected by the data and represents the main innovative ndings of this
paper: strong creditor rights shifting the rm toward less risky behavior a¤ect positively (S > 0) foreign
shareholders, while strong shareholder rights  shifting the rm toward riskier projects a¤ect negatively
(B < 0) foreign bondholders. This evidence suggests that foreign stakeholders value risk-reducing practices
more than domestic stakeholders do, thus providing support to the conjecture that foreign stakeholders are
relatively more sensitive to the perceived riskiness of domestic assets.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
We consider bilateral portfolio investments in equities and debt securities by 14 major investing countries
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States for the period 20012006. We adopt the CPIS (Coordinated
Portfolio Investment Survey, by IMF) dataset which has been exploited in many recent papers (Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007); Sorensen et al. (2007); Fidora et al. (2007)). This survey collects security-level data
from the major custodians and large end-investors. Portfolio investment is broken down by instrument (equity
or debt) and residence of issuer, the latter providing information on the destination of portfolio investment.8
The opportunity set is made up of 20 destination stock markets: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Sin-
gapore, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States9 .
Finally, the full set of regressors included in the analysis is described in detail in Appendix B and its
impact on portfolio investment is discussed in next session.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Descriptive statistics on foreign bias
We show in Table 1 average domestic share for each investing country. For reference, we report in the second
column average market share, that is, the respective fraction of world market capitalization that would prevail
as optimal portfolio share under the assumption of no market segmentation. As expected, all countries display
8While the CPIS provides the most comprehensive survey of international portfolio investment holdings, it is still subject to
a number of important caveats. See www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm for more details on the survey.
9Since we focus on foreign portfolio allocation, the destination stock markets number 19, since the domestic country is
excluded from analysis. The GLS regression is run, therefore, on 1576 observations (19 observations for each year for each
investing country, with some missing values). As is common practice, Switzerland, Luxembourg and Ireland are excluded from
the sample since they are considered in the international nance literature as mainly o¤-shore nancial centers.
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home bias; that is, they place a disproportionate fraction of their nancial wealth in domestic assets. All
countries invest internally more than 50 percent of their portfolio, with Austria and Netherlands the only
exceptions for stocks and Austria for bonds. Quite interestingly, the home bias in bonds is on average higher
than in equities, consistent with the ndings of Sorensen et al. (2007). The pervasive and persistent home
bias reveals the asymmetric investment behavior of foreign and domestic investors with respect to asset-
observable characteristics. In Table 2 , we turn from home bias to bilateral foreign bias, computed as the
ratio of actual share to market share, following equation (2). We report average bias in several destination
countries, obtained by averaging across investing countries the bilateral foreign bias. There emerges a notable
degree of heterogeneity in bias toward various foreign assets. To provide an economic interpretation for this
measure, consider that a bias measure equal to 1 implies that the foreign asset enters the portfolio with a
weight equal to its stock market share. The evidence that foreign bias is almost always below unity i.e., the
evidence that foreign assets are underweighted is not surprising given the strong home bias reported in Table
1. Notwithstanding the larger home bias in the bond portfolio, the median foreign bias is larger for bonds
than for stocks: the median destination country enters with 58 and 43 percent of their market share in the
bond portfolio and stock portfolio, respectively. The stock market foreign bias ranges from 0.12 for Canada
to 1.09 for Sweden, which jointly with Finland, are the only countries overweighted on average by foreign
investors. In the bond market, the lowest foreign bias is found in South Korea and Japan (0.03) while the
highest is found in Netherlands (1.21). Interestingly, the destination countries with a foreign bias above the
median, both in the stock and in the bond portfolios, are mainly members of the European Monetary Union
(EMU). These ndings are consistent with the evidence of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), who nd a notable
increase in foreign investments in EMU countries by EMU countries as a result of monetary integration. For
our purposes, the most intriguing element is the overall heterogeneity across destination countries. This
indeed suggests that there might be some country-specic e¤ect among which are investor protection laws
making some countries more attractive than others for foreign investors. Finally, in the last column, we
report the standard deviation of the bilateral foreign bias around the average: this provides information
on the dispersion of the bilateral foreign bias of various investing countries with respect to the average.
The degree of dispersion, compared to the average, is quite large: on average, the standard deviation is 90
percent of the average bias for stocks with roughly the same magnitude for bonds. The evidence of strong
dispersion underlines another interesting feature for our analytical purposes: beyond the di¤erences between
domestic and foreign investors and the di¤erences arising from destination-country e¤ects, there might also
be investing-country e¤ects and/or bilateral-specic components that induce di¤ering evaluations of the same
assets by di¤erent investors. This suggests the need to consider both bilateral-specic and country-specic
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factors as potential determinants of cross-border investment in our empirical analysis10 .
3.2.2 Stock market
Bilateral-specic regressors We rst account for bilateral-specic factors as the natural determinants
of bias in the foreign portfolio. The rst variables included in the regression analysis are the proximity
variables. Market proximity captures the inuence of asymmetric information on investor portfolio choice
(Gehrig (1993); Brennan and Cao (1997); Kang and Stulz (1997)). Many empirical contributions nd that
the cultural and geographic proximity of the market has an important inuence on investor stock holdings
and trading (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001); Chan et al. (2005); Portes and Rey (2005)). The regressors are
distance, common border dummy and common language dummy11 . The common border (language) dummy
takes the value 1 if the investing and destination country share a common border (language) and 0 otherwise.
The rst two variables, distance and common border, simply capture physical distance between the country
of the investor and the destination country12 . Since transactions in nancial assets are "weightless", a role for
distance may be found only if it has informational content (Portes and Rey (2005)). The role of the common
language dummy is immediately interpretable, since foreign languages make collecting information more
di¢ cult. These variables play an economically and statistically signicant role in explaining the dependent
variable as conrmed by the sizeable adjusted-R2 (0.6). The elasticity of foreign bias to relative distance is
about 0.5, while sharing a common language increases portfolio bias by 16 percent (e0:151 = 1:163) and a
common border boosts the dependent variable by 80 percent.
We then account for other bilateral variables, capturing bilateral-specic linkages: namely, common cur-
rency area (EMU), common exchange platform (Euronext), and common legal origin. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007) and Lane (2006) analyze the portfolio investment patterns of EMU countries after EMU integration
revealing, for both xed securities markets and stock markets, a Euro-area bias; that is, EMU member coun-
tries disproportionately invest in one another relative to other country pairs. Moreover, after controlling for
EMU integration, Giofré (2008) nds a separate role for the consolidation of stock exchanges in the Euronext
platforms. This reects, on the one hand, higher liquidity enhanced by stock market mergers (Padilla and
Pagano (2005)), and on the other hand the common platform may have helped to alleviate informational
asymmetries by inducing adoption of common standard accounting rules and practices. The EMU (Euronext)
dummy takes the value 1 if the investing and destination countries are EMU (Euronext) members and 0 oth-
10Consistent with our approach, Guiso et al. (2009) nd that the perceived credibility of managers in various nations depends
on matchspecic, destination-countryspecic, and source-countryspecic factors.
11See Appendix B for further details.
12A separate role for the border dummy can be found insofar as this variable is considered as "correcting" the distance variable,
which is measured as the great circle distance between the capital cities of the destination and investing countries. Please note
that the variables entering our regression are in relative terms.
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erwise. The coe¢ cients of both variables are positive and signicant and their e¤ect is quite large: EMU
membership and Euronext membership boost bilateral bias by 2.5 times and 1.2 times, respectively.
Finally, sharing the same legal framework might encourage cross-border investment since there is less fear
of unknown factors (Guiso et al. (2009); Lane (2006)). We include a dummy variable (dummy_eq_law)
taking the value 1 if the investing and destination countries share the same legal framework (i.e., civil law
or common law) and 0 otherwise. However, in the spirit of LLSV (1998), common law countries should
provide both shareholders and creditors the strongest protection: the common law status of a destination
country should represent, per se, a factor attracting foreign investors, thus reducing the role played by the
same legal family factor. We therefore also interact common legal origin with a dummy taking the value
1 if the destination country belongs to the common law family and 0 otherwise, with the expectation of a
negative sign. In column 2, both the dummy_eq_law and its interaction with the common law status of the
destination country have expected positive and negative sign, respectively, but are not statistically signicant
(column (2)). However, they become very signicant in statistical and economic terms when controlling for
other factors (columns (3)-(7))13 .
Investor protection variables After controlling for bilateral-specic regressors, we shift the focus of our
analysis to destination-country-specic factors14 . Asset-specic factors are relevant only to the extent that
there is some heterogeneity in their evaluation on the part of investors. Otherwise, any asset-specic factor
should be properly capitalized into the assets market price (Dahlquist et al. (2003)). In our case, if all
investing countries equally weighted a given factor, there should be no impact on portfolio bias. Conversely,
if one type of investor were more heavily a¤ected than other investors by one factor, this should play a
signicant role in determining portfolio allocation. More specically, if foreign investors were particularly
inuenced by investor protection laws, these laws should help to explain the distance between the foreign
portfolio position and what is predicted by market share.
We include rst the variables capturing investor protection rights15 . Investor protection laws can inuence
equity portfolio bias through either "direct" or "cross" e¤ects. The direct impact of investor protection
laws is the e¤ect of shareholder rights on foreign shareholders. The index of shareholder rights (LLSV
(1998)) measures how strongly the legal system favors minority shareholders against managers or dominant
shareholders in the corporate decision making process. The cross e¤ect is instead the e¤ect of investor
13Our results are consistent with Vlachos (2004), who shows that cultural and regulatory di¤erences generate a negative
impact on cross-country portfolio holdings
14The regression includes xed investing country e¤ects to take into account the specicity of the investor.
15Note that the endogeneity critique often raised against LLSV (1998) is much less an issue here. In fact, whereas in LLSV
(1998) the direction of causality between investor protection laws and development of nancial markets (aggregate asset supply)
is controversial, this is not the case in our analysis. The dependent variable here is in fact the bilateral bias (bilateral asset
demand), that is, the ratio between bilateral portfolio position and market share, and the direction of causality, if any, goes
arguably from investor protection to portfolio bias.
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protection legislation on "non-target" investors namely, the e¤ect of creditor rights on foreign shareholders.
Results with respect to the direct e¤ect of shareholder rights reveal that for each 1 percent increase in
relative shareholder protection rights in destination countries there is an increase in foreign bias by 0.4
percent16 . Interestingly, also the cross e¤ect of creditor rights on stockholders is positive, statistically and
economically signicant, and its size constitutes one-third of the direct e¤ect. Creditor rights might impact,
a priori, foreign equity portfolios in either direction: on the one hand, stronger creditor rights might be
viewed as mitigating rm risk-taking, thereby lowering the perceived variability of the underlying asset; on
the other hand, as suggested by Acharya et al. (2008), strong creditor protection laws might induce rms to
engage in risk-reducing investments, such as diversifying acquisitions that are potentially ine¢ cient and value
reducing. Excessively strong creditor rights in default could lead to ine¢ cient liquidations that extinguish
the continuation option of a rms enterprise and thereby hurt stockholders. When creditor rights mandate
the dismissal of management, a private cost is imposed on managers. To avoid these costs, shareholders and
managers lower the likelihood of distress by reducing operating risk. If this implies a reduction in value not
compensated adequately by a reduction in risk, then creditorsrights entail dead-weight costs to rms and
to the whole economy. In particular, Acharya et al. (2008) nd that stronger creditor rights are associated
with lower operating risk and a greater propensity to pursue diversifying acquisitions and mergers. Since
corporate diversication has been shown in some studies to destroy value, strong creditor rights may have
negative consequences for shareholders. The evidence in our analysis shows that strong creditor rights laws
have a positive impact on shareholders, thus suggesting that the risk-reducing e¤ect prevails over the prot-
reducing e¤ect. This outcome can be easily rationalized from a foreign investors perspective because, as
the literature shows, foreign investors are relatively more severely a¤ected by information asymmetry. Such
investors plausibly perceive domestic assets as more risky than do domestic investors (Gehrig (1993)), such
that any institutional devices allowing investors to reduce riskiness are more valuable to foreigners than to
domestic investors.
To be sure that what we capture is the e¤ect of investor protection laws, we must control for correlated
confounding factors. LLSV (1998) show how creditor and shareholder rights are strongly linked to legal
origin. We therefore include a series of dummies to capture the legal family of the destination country:
French, English, German and Scandinavian17 . Since the English origin dummy is multicollinear with the
variable obtained interacting the common legal framework with the common law dummy of the destination
16This result is consistent with recent evidence by Thapa and Poshakwale (2009). Adopting the same data set, these authors
nd that countries with better investment proles, quality of institutions and law enforcement, attract more foreign portfolio
investment.
17Note that this is a destination-country-specic dummy and is di¤erent from the above-mentined common legal framework
variable, which is a bilateral-specic variable identifying whether investing and destination countries share the same legal
framework, common law or civil law.
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country, we need to drop two legal family dummy variables out of four to avoid multicollinearity (the second
dummy dropped is the Scandinavian origin dummy). We are therefore left with the German and French legal
system dummies. The evidence is consistent with LLSV (1998) and suggests that French and German legal
origins induce lower investments. Interestingly, even after accounting for the legal origin of the destination
country, shareholder rights and creditor rights are still economically and statistically relevant in explaining
foreign investment.
Substitutes for investor protection rules In principle, a strong system of legal enforcement could
substitute for weak rules: active and well functioning courts can serve as recourse for investors aggrieved by
management (LLSV (1998)).
To control for this substitution e¤ect, we include variables that capture the soundness of the economic
environment from a more general to a more specic level: one variable that captures the general level of
corruption in the economy, one variable related to capital risk, and one variable capturing the transparency
of accounting rules. Finally, we control for ownership concentration and e¢ ciency of the judicial system,
which can substitute for legal protection in an environment of poor investor protection.
Corruption, expropriation risk and accounting rules Corruption and risk of expropriation cap-
ture government stance toward business while accounting standards are critical to corporate governance in
that they render company disclosure interpretable. Aggarwal et al. (2005), nd that countries with better
accounting standards, shareholder rights, legal frameworks, and rms issuing ADRs attract more US mutual
fund investment relative to benchmark indices. Their results emphasize that high-quality accounting infor-
mation allows foreign investors to monitor and protect their investments and to e¢ ciently allocate capital.
Analogously, we nd that while corruption and risk of expropriation show a non-systematic impact on for-
eign portfolio investment, good accounting practices have a strong and robust impact. Moreover, investor
protection variables have a stronger e¤ect on portfolio positions when controlling for economic environment
factors: both the direct and the cross factor increase by more than one standard deviation.
Ownership concentration A potentially powerful substitute for poor legal structure is ownership
concentration. In the presence of poor investor protection, ownership concentration becomes a substitute
for legal protection (LLSV (1998)). Some concentration of ownership within a rm is typically e¢ cient in
providing managers incentives to work and in providing large investors incentives to monitor managers and
thus increase the value of the rm (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). However, some dispersion of ownership is
also desirable to diversify risk.
We incorporate the e¤ect of ownership concentration using two alternative procedures. First of all we
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account for it by correcting the foreign bias portfolio for the fraction of shares closely held. Second, we
consider the impact of ownership on foreign portfolio bias and its indirect impact through shareholder rights.
Let us illustrate the rst procedure. Dahlquist et al. (2003) estimate the fraction of shares closely held across
51 countries, nding that on average 32 percent of shares are not available for trading and cannot therefore
be held by foreign investors. This illustrates a measurement error in the size of domestic and foreign bias
that was neglected by previous literature. These authors construct the world oat portfolio, which considers
only shares that can actually be held by investors. Following Dahlquist et al. (2003), we consider the fraction
of closely held shares as exogenous, thus making it relatively easy to correct the exogenous asset supply and
to compute the corrected bias measure. The dependent variable to be explained is therefore now changed
such that it might potentially a¤ect our results, since countries with stronger protection rights are those
with a lower proportion of closely held shares. In column 6a, we report results after adopting the world
oat portfolio. The signicant role played by investor protection is qualitatively unchanged. Interestingly,
we observe a lower direct impact and a stronger cross impact of investor protection rights: the impact of
shareholder rights falls to one-third, albeit still statistically signicant and economically relevant, while the
impact of creditor rights notably increases18 .
Secondly, we include ownership concentration directly, as a possible determinant of foreign position:
this is an alternative way to account for closely held shares, since countries with the largest fraction of
closely held shares are also those in which ownership concentration is stronger. Moreover, the inclusion of
ownership concentration allows to consider it as a determinant of the demand side of the bias more than
as a factor correcting the supply side. Ownership concentration per se might have an impact on foreign
bias since expropriation risk could be perceived as particularly dangerous by foreign minority shareholders.
We observe indeed that countries with higher ownership concentration attract less foreign investment. More
interestingly for our analysis, ownership concentration could also a¤ect portfolio investment through investor
protection laws. On the one hand, the more concentrated the ownership structure in the economy, the
more important are shareholder protection rights that defend minority shareholders. On the other hand,
as suggested by LLSV (1998), the weaker the investor protection, the more incentive toward ownership
concentration. These two e¤ects are in contrast with one another and it is impossible a priori to predict the
sign of the coe¢ cient for the interaction of shareholder rights with ownership concentration. In our regression,
the sign of the coe¢ cient is positive but not statistically signicant. It is worth noting how, the introduction
18 In contrast, Dahlquist et al. (2003) nd that di¤erences in investor rights and nancial development across countries cannot
explain the portfolio investment of US investors when including the oat portfolio as determinant. However, these authors admit
that the improvement in the coe¢ cient estimate when using the world oat portfolio instead of the value-weighted portfolio is
economically negligible. This suggests that closely held shares are far from being the pivotal determinant of portfolio investment
positions and that other factors are likely to play a role, even though in their analysis which is focused on US investors only 
investor protection variables are found non-signicant. However, the low number of observations (20) could be a factor severely
undermining the statistical inference on the estimated coe¢ cients.
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of concentration of ownership weakens the role played by legal family dummies, French and German origin.
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) assess that ownership is more concentrated when investor protection is weaker.
Accordingly, we nd that, when accounting for concentration, the coe¢ cients of the dummy for French and
German legal family, originally negative, are either reduced in size or become non-signicant. Since legal
family origin is correlated with investor protection, which in turn is correlated with ownership concentration,
the negative impact of French and German legal origin on foreign investment is captured mainly by the
ownership concentration coe¢ cients19 .
E¢ ciency of the judicial system Finally, the e¢ ciency of the judicial system can act as the most
obvious substitute mechanism for poor investor protection laws. If this is the case, we should observe that
the stronger the e¢ ciency of the judicial system, the lower the impact of investor protection laws. We
interact both creditor rights and shareholder rights with the e¢ ciency of the judicial system to infer how the
importance of the law depends on the degree of e¢ ciency of the judicial system. What we observe is in line
with the ndings of LLSV (1998) and in contrast with the substitutability hypothesis: stronger e¢ ciency of
the judicial system reinforces the role played by investor protection on foreign investments; that is, the laws
on the books are more e¤ective when they are better enforced.
In summary, we underscore that both shareholder rights and creditor rights positively inuence foreign
portfolio investments. Foreign stock portfolio investments are attracted by strong shareholder rights, which
better protect portfolio minority investors. Also, strong creditor rights, by mitigating excessive risk exposure,
turn out to benet foreign shareholders, who are more sensitive to information asymmetry than domestic
shareholders. Quite interestingly, the cross e¤ect, that is the coe¢ cient of creditor rights, is comparable in
size to the coe¢ cient of shareholder rights. This piece of evidence suggests that ignoring the cross e¤ect
of investor protection laws entails missing a prominent component of the incentives provided by corporate
governance for foreign investors.
3.2.3 Bond market
Bilateral specic regressors We now replicate the same analysis, taking the perspective of foreign bond-
holders. Our objective is to identify the direct and cross e¤ect of investor protection laws on cross-border
investments in xed securities.
Following the above analysis, we rst consider bilateral-specic variables as determinants of heterogeneity
in portfolio position, then focus on destination-specic variables.
19 It is often recommended to center continuous variables (subtract the mean) before interacting them, to make the e¤ects
more easily interpretable. This reccommendation is fullled here since, consistent with the theoretical model, all variables are
entered in logs and in relative terms with respect to the world average (i.e., their logs are demeaned).
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The distance variable has a signicant impact on bondholders, with a coe¢ cient even larger than for
stockholders, while the border dummy shows a counterintuitive negative coe¢ cient. However, when other
controls are added in the full specication, this negative impact disappears. The language dummy is strongly
signicant, even more so than for stocks: sharing a common language has the e¤ect of increasing the dependent
variable by 2.7 times. When controlling for other determinants, this e¤ect is signicantly reduced to 35
percent, but is still twice as large as the corresponding e¤ect for stocks. The EMU dummy coe¢ cient is
very large and strongly signicant: the common currency area determines an impact almost ve times larger
for member countries. The e¤ect is stronger than in the stock market case while sharing a common stock
exchange (Euronext), which plays an important role for stockholders, does not positively a¤ect bondholders.
This latter piece of evidence shows that the information content of the common Euronext platform does not
spillover from the stock market to the bond market. The same legal framework dummy shows a negative sign
but this seems to be the result of an omitted variable problem since, as soon as we control for destination-
specic legal origin, this negative e¤ect disappears and, in the full specication case, the impact of the
common legal framework has the expected positive sign. In the rst specication, the interaction of the
equal law dummy with the dummy capturing the common versus civil law origin of the destination country
is (counterintuitively) positive when the equal law dummy is (counterintuitively) negative: it has an opposite
sign with respect to the equal law dummy, conrming the conjecture that the common law legal origin of
the destination country mitigates the e¤ect of sharing the same legal background. The interaction turns out
to be non-signicant in the full specication case, where the equal law variable becomes, consistent with the
expectation, positive and signicant.
Investor protection variables As for stocks, destination-country-specic factors could be responsible for
heterogeneity in portfolio bias to the extent that these factors do not evenly a¤ect all investors. We rst focus
on the e¤ect of creditor rights. The adopted measure of creditor rights indicates how easily a creditor may
exercise her rights or how easy it is to foreclose on collateral (LLSV (1998)). We expect strong creditor rights
to induce more investment in debt securities, as investors are better protected against the risk of default.
What we immediately observe is that the coe¢ cient of creditor rights is instead negative. These ndings
are at odds with our predictions, but the type of index of investor protection adopted necessitates a caveat:
while shareholder rights is an indicator well tailored for our purposes, the interpretation of the variable that
captures creditor rights is less straightforward. There are di¤erent types of creditors, with di¤erent interests;
protecting the rights of some creditors might have the e¤ect of reducing the rights of others. Senior loans
have priority over bondholders, preferred shareholders, and common stockholders in the event of default. In
assessing creditor rights, LLSV (1998) take the perspective of senior secured creditors, as most debt around
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the world is of that type. In case of a default, senior secured creditors may have a simple interest in taking
possession of collateral no matter what happens to the rm, whereas junior unsecured creditors may wish to
preserve the rm so that they can possibly get some of their money back in case the rm eventually makes
some prots. What we actually observe in our analysis is the e¤ect of senior secured creditor rights on bond
investments such that we can expect a less clear-cut direct e¤ect than for the stock portfolio20 . Comfortingly,
after controlling for other determinants, creditor rights are found to positively a¤ect bond bias in the full
specication case (column 7), even though the statistical signicance of the coe¢ cient is not very high.
The predicted direction of the cross e¤ect, namely the e¤ect of shareholder rights on bondholders, is
theoretically not so obvious. On the one hand, an e¤ective corporate governance mechanism can a¤ect
bond yields and ratings through its impact on the default risk of the rm. Indeed, e¢ cient governance
mechanisms reduce potential conicts of interest between management and providers of capital through
e¤ective monitoring. This can reduce expropriation or misallocation of funds, improve the rms productivity
and disclosure and could be perceived positively by bondholders, resulting in a reduction in the default risk
of the rm and thus predicting a positive impact of strong shareholder rights on bondholders.
On the other hand, bondholders and shareholders can also have conicting interests. In particular,
bondholders and stockholders can disagree about the amount of risk the rm should take. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) detail how the existence of outstanding debt creates a moral hazard
problem where stockholder interests diverge from the interests of creditors. Jensen and Meckling (1976)
underline how highly leveraged rms, i.e., rms where creditors are more at risk, have incentives to engage
in risky asset portfolios because of information asymmetry. If we view the equity of a leveraged rm as
equivalent to a call option, we can easily see how shareholders have incentive to increase the riskiness of
the rm: the payo¤ to shareholders is unbounded, so there is some positive probability of a large payo¤,
whereas debt holderspayo¤ is limited. The moral hazard problem can of course be mitigated using restrictive
covenants, but the costs of writing and enforcing these contracts are not economically trivial. Furthermore,
even costly and severe constraints can leave open opportunities to shift risks and rewards.
On an empirical level, Klock et al. (2004) investigate the impact of anti-takeover provisions on wealth
transfers between stockholders and bondholders. Bondholders, by denition, have a limited upside potential
and signicant downside risk. Takeovers, which increase the nancial risk of the rm by adding debt, can
therefore result in wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders. This suggests that provisions shifting
power from managers to shareholders can result in shareholder expropriation of bondholder wealth. Market-
based data provide evidence that antitakeover amendments, although not benecial to stockholders, are
20The cross e¤ect of creditor rights on foreign shareholders, which is discussed later, is much less controversial; it indeed
captures how foreign shareholders benet from the protection of interests limiting downside risk, regardless of the nature of the
protected creditor.
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viewed positively in the bond market: strong antitakeover provisions (weak shareholder rights) are indeed
associated with a lower cost of debt nancing. This analysis strongly suggests that it is important to examine
the e¤ects of governance provisions on all classes of securities before concluding that particular provisions
are desirable. Cremers et al. (2007) emphasize how policies beneting stockholders do not generally benet
bondholders. In particular, various governance mechanisms available to shareholders can have di¤erent conse-
quences for bondholders. For example, acquisitions and disciplinary takeovers can benet target shareholders
but also hurt target bondholders by adding more debt to the rm as rm leverage generally increases after
a takeover. This increase in leverage can reduce the value of outstanding bonds, not only by increasing the
probability and the deadweight costs of a possible future bankruptcy, but also by reordering the priority of
claims in bankruptcy.
However, the cost of debt, which is the focus of the above-mentioned contributions, does not reveal the
existence of di¤erences in the e¤ects that these conicting interests can generate on foreign investors with
respect to home country investors, because what is priced by the market is aggregate behavior. Ultimately,
the question of the impact of shareholder protection provisions on foreign bondholders is an empirical one
and depends on foreignersperception of the balance between various interests.
To estimate the cross e¤ect of investor protection on bondholders, we add the shareholder rights variable
to our specication and nd a negative but not precisely estimated impact on bondholders. However, after
controlling for the legal family of the destination country, which is correlated with destination-country in-
vestor protection legislation, the negative cross e¤ect of shareholder rights (about -0.3) emerges and remains
economically and statistically signicant in all subsequent specications.
Substitutes for investor protection rules We control for possible mechanisms to substitute for the
role played by creditor rights, analogously to what we have done for shareholder rights. Controlling for the
soundness of the economic system, we nd that corruption and accounting transparency have the expected
sign, are always very large in size, and are statistically signicant in all specications. Conversely, the
expropriation risk variable has a not well-dened impact on bond portfolios. Interestingly, the coe¢ cients
of the interaction of the e¢ ciency of the judicial system with both creditor rights and shareholder rights
are positive. This suggests that the e¢ ciency of the judicial system on the one hand amplies the e¤ect of
creditor rights, and on the other hand it dampens the negative role played by strong shareholder rights that
are perceived as less harmful in a context where laws protecting investor rights are better enforced. The risk
run by creditors mainly consists of default risk and the priority of claimants such that the role played by
the judicial system is inevitably particularly relevant. In the nal column, for comparison with the analysis
of stock portfolios, we control for concentration of ownership: the e¤ect of concentration on bondholders
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is here non-signicant and the role played by shareholder rights is not inuenced whatsoever by ownership
concentration.
Our ndings uncover for bondholders a positive role played by creditor rights conditional on the e¢ ciency
of the judicial system, and a negative impact of shareholder rights, which are perceived to increase the default
probability. Strong shareholder rights can be detrimental to foreign bondholder interests as they can induce
excessive risk-taking behavior in rms.
We conrm and reinforce the evidence on the relatively strong importance of cross e¤ects over direct
e¤ects. In fact, the role of creditor rights is more signicant for shareholders than for bondholders and the
negative impact of shareholder rights protection on bondholders turns out to be greater (in absolute value)
than its positive direct impact on foreign stock positions. These results suggest that policies designed to
attract foreign investments ought to take into account the interaction of multiple governance mechanisms,
since the cross e¤ects of investor protection laws are not necessarily second order e¤ects.
4 Summary and conclusions
We investigate the impact of investor protection laws on foreign bilateral investment, namely foreign equity
portfolio investments and foreign bond portfolio investments. The empirical literature has shown that market
capitalization as a whole depends positively on investor protection but these ndings do not permit disen-
tangling foreign from domestic e¤ects. Asset prices in fact reect the joint behavior of foreign and domestic
investors and we must examine foreign allocation decisions to uncover the impact of corporate governance
on foreign stakeholders. Analogously, results on the impact of shareholder rights and creditor rights on rm
value or debt cost hide the role played by foreign investors.
Our results show, rst, that investor protection laws have a signicant impact on foreign investments, thus
implying di¤ering e¤ects of corporate governance provisions on domestic versus foreign investors. Specically,
we nd that strong shareholder rights (creditor rights) stimulate foreign equity (bond) portfolio investments.
Since foreign investors are mostly a¤ected by information asymmetry issues, these ndings can also be
interpreted as corporate governance rules serving as a means to overcome information asymmetries and
thereby to enhance international diversication.
Secondly, our ndings highlight how laws protecting di¤erent interests asymmetrically a¤ect foreign stake-
holders. In particular, foreign shareholders appreciate strong creditor rights, which potentially mitigate the
riskiness of projects, while bondholders are negatively a¤ected by strong shareholder rights, which might
induce the rm especially if highly leveraged to engage in excessively risky behavior.
The immediate implication to draw from this picture is that strengthening investor protection is not
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a universally desirable policy. Specically, our results suggest that stronger creditor rights are helpful in
attracting foreign investment, while stronger shareholder rights are e¤ective in attracting foreign equity
investment but may deter foreign bond investment in equal measure. Thus, the choice to reinforce shareholder
rights can be read as a choice to benet foreign shareholders to the detriment of foreign bondholders.
In particular, evidence for the relatively strong impact of the cross e¤ect of investor protection laws over
the direct e¤ect suggests that ignoring cross e¤ects entails not only missing one aspect of the overall picture,
but possibly most of it.
It is worth stressing now two major limitations that challenge the generalisability and validity of our
ndings.
First, our work is limited to the investigation of the e¤ects of investor protection rights on cross-border
investments, while a more comprehensive analysis should be performed to derive general welfare conclusions
on the desirability of stronger or weaker investor protection. Moreover, we consider the determinants of
foreign investments, leaving unexplored the e¤ect on domestic investors. For instance, it may be the case
that strong creditor laws attract foreign shareholders but deter domestic ones; that is, in the presence of
strong creditor rights, rms are more prone to engage in risk-reducing investments such as diversifying
acquisitions that are potentially ine¢ cient and value reducing for the domestic investors perceived level
of riskiness (Acharya et al. (2008)). On the other hand, strong shareholder rights are found to negatively
impact foreign bondholders, but this may not be the case for domestic bondholders, who may benet from
better shareholder governance. Unfortunately, domestic positions are harder to investigate due to the limited
number of available observations (one for each investing country for each available year) and to the di¢ culty
in capturing the determinants of home bias.
Second, our stylized theoretical setting ignores ination and exchange rate uncertainty, like many other
models that focus on barriers to international investment (Dahlquist et al. (2003)). These factors are un-
doubtedly relevant and may represent an additional source of asymmetry between foreign and domestic
investors. However, they are unlikely to be strongly correlated with investor protection laws and therefore
do not undermine our results21 .
Our ndings may also contribute to the literature on the failure of convergence in investor protection
legislation. Djankov et al. (2008) nd no convergence in creditor scores. La Porta et al. (2000) reject the
hypothesis of legal convergence of rules and enforcement mechanisms toward some successful standard of
e¤ective investor protection. Mansi et al. (2009) suggest that countries also compete on legal dimensions in
21Moreover, our model remains unchanged, and our results still hold, in the presence of ination and exchange rate uncertainty,
provided that returns are real, that purchasing power parity holds, and that there is an asset that has a risk-free real return.
See Lewis (1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) for a review of the e¤ects of ination and exchange rate uncertainty on portfolio
choice.
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terms of their e¤ectiveness in attracting investment, but not all jurisdictions need to or should converge to
the single best or worst alternative. Consistently, our ndings may provide a rationale for the evidence of
no convergence toward the strongest investor protection setting; that is, the level of investor protection in
each country is endogenously determined by the balance of many forces among them, the political choice to
promote inward investment and to favour particular categories of investor may play an especially important
role.
In the aftermath of the recent global nancial crisis, the shared view is to implement more regulation to
constrain nancial institutions from taking excessive risk and to protect investors. However, as underlined
by Bruno and Claessens (2007), there can emerge costs from overregulation and regulations need to be
well designed. Our ndings emphasize the need to accurately evaluate direct and indirect consequences of
strengthening regulations.
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Table 1. Home bias
This table reports, for both stock and bond portfolios, the domestic share and the market share of each investing country.
The reported gure are averages over the period 2001-2006. Source : Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF) and
Datastream (Thomson Financial)
domestic
share
market
share
domestic
share
market
share
Austria 0.362 0.002 0.404 0.007
Belgium 0.509 0.007 0.611 0.013
Finland 0.603 0.006 0.522 0.003
France 0.681 0.046 0.571 0.047
Germany 0.502 0.035 0.737 0.072
Italy 0.629 0.023 0.788 0.049
Netherlands 0.289 0.019 0.569 0.022
Spain 0.772 0.018 0.713 0.024
Canada 0.825 0.029 0.931 0.021
Denmark 0.554 0.004 0.796 0.008
Japan 0.709 0.107 0.835 0.148
Sweden 0.550 0.010 0.739 0.008
United Kingdom 0.652 0.087 0.478 0.040
United States 0.814 0.436 0.943 0.413
Stock market Bond market
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics on bias in foreign portfolios
This table reports the average and standard deviation of portfolio bias by the fourteen investing countries in each destination
country index (head of rows) included in the opportunity set. Statistics are reported for both stock market and bond market.
Source : Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF)
average
bias
standard
deviation
of bias
average
bias
standard
deviation
of bias
Austria 0.426 0.394 0.817 0.788
Belgium 0.469 0.455 0.559 0.492
Finland 1.001 0.811 0.974 0.922
France 0.665 0.461 0.601 0.446
Germany 0.743 0.830 0.773 0.638
Italy 0.439 0.263 0.634 0.502
Netherlands 0.921 0.542 1.208 0.844
Portugal 0.426 0.461 0.769 0.774
Spain 0.481 0.284 0.680 0.569
Australia 0.160 0.156 0.215 0.105
Canada 0.118 0.132 0.147 0.101
Denmark 0.367 0.398 0.604 0.689
Japan 0.179 0.101 0.026 0.037
Mexico 0.192 0.188 0.189 0.148
Sweden 1.089 2.018 0.908 1.302
United Kingdom 0.481 0.231 0.488 0.242
United States 0.224 0.164 0.117 0.072
South Korea 0.237 0.189 0.025 0.016
Hong Kong 0.151 0.146 0.287 0.712
Singapore 0.244 0.196 0.218 0.399
median 0.426 0.580
Stock market Bond market
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Table 3. Bias in foreign equity portfolios
This table reports results of the feasible GLS regression as in (3a) in the text. The dependent variable is the logarithm of
the ratio of portfolio share to market share, log(wlj=MSj); where the subscript lj represents the couple investment country l
-destination country j. Details on the variables included as regressors are provided in Appendix B. Constants and time dummies
are included but not reported. Cross-section weights standard errors (d.f. corrected) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and
* indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6a) (7)
rel_dist *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
( 0.019 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.020 )
dummy_lang ** * *** *
( 0.071 ) ( 0.096 ) ( 0.094 ) ( 0.094 ) ( 0.092 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.102 ) ( 0.083 )
dummy_border *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
( 0.071 ) ( 0.064 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.068 ) ( 0.057 )
dummy_emu *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
( 0.058 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.058 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.056 )
dummy_euronext ** 0.226 *** 0.273 *** 0.353 *** 0.506 *** -0.025 0.312 ***
( 0.096 ) ( 0.091 ) ( 0.092 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.084 )
dummy_eq_law 0.259 *** 0.921 *** 0.601 *** 0.672 *** 0.976 *** 0.629 ***
( 0.047 ) ( 0.051 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.070 ) ( 0.066 )
dummy_eq_law*common_law *** *** *** *** *** ***
( 0.111 ) ( 0.120 ) ( 0.122 ) ( 0.137 ) ( 0.133 ) ( 0.156 ) ( 0.139 )
dummy_german *** *** *
( 0.056 ) ( 0.077 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.094 )
dummy_french -0.369 *** -0.196 *** 0.845 *** 0.147
( 0.052 ) ( 0.075 ) ( 0.088 ) ( 0.109 )
rel_shrights *** *** *** *** *** *
( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.052 ) ( 0.069 )
rel_shrights*rel_eff_jud ***
( 0.303 )
rel_shrights*rel_concentr
( 0.241 )
rel_credrights *** *** *** *** ***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.041 ) ( 0.048 ) ( 0.043 )
rel_credrights*rel_eff_jud **
( 0.353 )
rel_control_corr * ***
( 0.265 ) ( 0.309 ) ( 0.487 )
rel_risk_expr
( 0.419 ) ( 0.487 ) ( 0.943 )
rel_account *** *** ***
( 0.110 ) ( 0.128 ) ( 0.114 )
rel_concentr ***
( 0.060 )
#obs 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579
Adj-R2 0.60 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.77 0.74 0.79
-0.604
1.221
-1.327
-0.284
0.065
0.578
1.725
-1.083
0.921
-0.174
0.117
0.123
1.986
0.334
0.744
-0.480
0.151
0.592
-0.358
0.181
0.419
0.914
0.221
0.019
-0.075 -1.403
-0.315
0.432
-0.318
0.121
0.486
1.089
-0.578
0.419
-0.374
0.181
0.478
0.932
0.440
0.155
0.518
0.921
-0.700
-0.320
1.027
0.557
1.027
-1.245
-0.430
0.375
0.186
-0.244
-0.117
0.734
1.314
-1.913
0.050
1.130
0.245 0.757
Bias in foreign equity portfolios
-0.371
0.443
1.965
0.671
1.167
-0.480
-0.360
0.156
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Table 4. Bias in foreign bond portfolios
The table reports results of the feasible GLS regression as in (3b) in the text. The dependent variable is the logarithm of
the ratio of portfolio share to market share, log(wlj=MSj); where the subscript lj represents the couple investment country l
-destination country j. Details on the variables included as regressors are provided in Appendix B. Constants and time dummies
are included but not reported. Cross-section weights standard errors (d.f. corrected) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and
* indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
rel_dist *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
( 0.029 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.028 )
dummy_lang *** * ** ** **
( 0.121 ) ( 0.147 ) ( 0.146 ) ( 0.146 ) ( 0.136 ) ( 0.136 ) ( 0.128 ) ( 0.129 )
dummy_border *** *** ***
( 0.111 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.096 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.091 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.088 ) ( 0.089 )
dummy_emu *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
( 0.085 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.081 ) ( 0.119 ) ( 0.081 ) ( 0.085 )
dummy_euronext *** -0.481 *** -0.494 *** -0.445 *** -0.593 *** -0.424 *** -0.450 ***
( 0.127 ) ( 0.126 ) ( 0.127 ) ( 0.119 ) ( 0.119 ) ( 0.121 ) ( 0.124 )
dummy_eq_law *** -0.617 *** -0.661 *** 0.121 -0.087 0.260 *** 0.289 ***
( 0.069 ) ( 0.070 ) ( 0.082 ) ( 0.089 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.097 )
dummy_eq_law*common_law *** *** *** ** ***
( 0.178 ) ( 0.182 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.219 ) ( 0.222 ) ( 0.216 ) ( 0.223 )
dummy_german *** *** *** ***
( 0.083 ) ( 0.119 ) ( 0.118 ) ( 0.146 )
dummy_french -0.622 *** 0.121 -0.109 0.084
( 0.078 ) ( 0.118 ) ( 0.128 ) ( 0.168 )
rel_shrights * *** *** **
( 0.069 ) ( 0.067 ) ( 0.071 ) ( 0.068 ) ( 0.109 )
rel_shrights*rel_eff_jud *** ***
( 0.470 ) ( 0.470 )
rel_shrights*rel_concentr
( 0.369 )
rel_credrights *** *** *** *
( 0.055 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.066 ) ( 0.067 )
rel_credrights*rel_eff_jud *** ***
( 0.350 ) ( 0.541 )
rel_control_corr *** *** ***
( 0.412 ) ( 0.481 ) ( 0.741 )
rel_risk_expr ***
( 0.638 ) ( 0.726 ) ( 1.418 )
rel_account ** *** ***
( 0.170 ) ( 0.174 ) ( 0.176 )
rel_concentr
( 0.095 )
#obs 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579
Adj-R2 0.56 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.70 0.71 0.74 0.74
2.811
3.371
Bias in foreign bond portfolios
3.5563.319
-0.698
0.208
-0.367
1.611
-0.207 0.109
0.873
0.885
-3.175
0.375
-0.546
0.227
-0.081
1.765
0.556
-1.345
-0.131
-0.011
2.247
-0.073
-0.353
-0.698
0.218
-0.354
1.614
2.143
-0.344
-0.499
0.304
-0.088
1.607
0.994
-0.630
-0.360
-0.658
0.176
-0.290
1.615
-0.356
-0.498
1.918
2.814
-0.813
1.029
-0.060
-0.530
-0.275
2.857
0.096
-0.055
1.702
0.245
-0.441
0.282
-0.026
4.574
-1.260
0.855
-0.517
-0.051
0.307
-0.447
-0.331
-0.652
0.289
1.685
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A Theoretical framework
Following Merton (1969) with constant relative risk aversion utility function and constant investment oppor-
tunities the vector of optimal portfolio shares takes the well known following form:
w =
1

 1(   ri)
where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, w is the vector of weights,  is the vector of stock
returns, r is the risk-free interest rate, i is a vector of ones and  is the variance-covariance matrix of stock
returns.
We incorporate in this standard setting investment cross-border barriers following Gehrig (1993) approach.
In his contribution foreign investments appear on average more risky to domestic investors -leading to an
information-based justication to home bias- and the portfolio of each investor is di¤erent depending on
the perceived variance-covariance matrix.22 We consider this approach focusing on foreign investment only,
considering a di¤erent investor-specic perceived variability of stock returns for each foreign stock index in
the investment opportunity set.
Denoting by Cl the matrix of investment barriers we rewrite the personalized vector of weights for each
investor l in the following way
wl =
1

 1l (   ri)
where l = 
Cl (and therefore 
 1
l = C
 1
l 

 1)23 . We obtain
wl = C
 1
l 

 1 1

(   ri) (4)
The diagonal NxN positive denite matrix Cl may be dened as
Cl =
266666664
Cl1 0       0
0
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . . Clj
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
0       0 ClN
377777775
where Clj is the bilateral cost of holding country js stock by country ls investor.
As Clj stands for the investment barrier cost for country l investing in j , its reciprocal
1
Clj
stands for a
variable capturing the investment "advantage" of country l investing in country j.
Therefore the equilibrium condition, equating stock demand and stock supply, will be
MS = 
 1

1

(   ri)

(5)
where MS represents the vector of market shares of stock market indexes (supply side) and the right
hand side is the (weighted) sum of stock indexesdemands (demand side).  is a diagonal NxN positive
denite matrix
22 In a standard setting with asymmetric information (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)) an informed investor has a lower perceived
variance due to its private signal but, at the same time, her perceived expected return is generally also di¤erent from the
uninformed investors. It implies that we should sometimes observe a "foreign-bias" when the domestic investors observe bad
signals. What we, instead, label "information asymmetries" throughout the paper is closer to the concept of "model uncertainty"
or "Knightian uncertainty" (Epstein and Miao (2003) and Uppal and Wang (2003)): roughly speaking, the foreign investors
perceived uncertainty is higher than the domestic investors one, though they observe the same return. This approach may
help to understand home bias because small di¤erences in the ambiguity about the return distributions can lead to largely
under-diversied portfolio holding. The same reasoning applies when considering the allocation in several foreign stock markets
rather than the choice between home and foreign assets.
23The matrix 
 is the universal variance-covariance matrix that would prevail in absence of investment barriers.
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 =
266666664
1 0       0
0
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . . j
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
0       0 N
377777775
where j =
PL
l=1MSl
1
Clj
is the average investment "advantage" in holding asset j across investors,
weighted by the market share of each investors domestic stock market.
Let us dene Dl = Cl, where Dl is again a diagonal NxN positive denite matrix. We can rewrite the
above expression (4) as
wl = D
 1
l 

 1  1
 (   ri)

(6)
where Dlj = jClj and
1
Dlj
=
1
CljPL
l=1MSl
1
Clj
and using the equilibrium condition (5) we get the following result
wl = D
 1
l MS (7)
or, in terms of individual asset, the following optimal portfolio weights
wlj =
1
Dlj
MSj (8)
MSj is the market share of stock index j in the world stock market, 1Dlj represents the relative (with
respect to world average) "advantage" of country l investing in asset j. In other words, the investor l will
demand a share of assets greater than the market share in proportion to 1Dlj (inverse of relative investment
cost). Note that if Clj = j , i.e. if the investment barrier for country l is equal to the average then the
investor l will hold the value market share of asset j.
In our analysis the risky portfolio shares considered can be either stocks or bonds since, as usual, the
unique risk-free asset is determined as the residual portfolio position.
B Data appendix
B.1 Dependent variables
Foreign stock market portfolios
The CPIS dataset contains information on foreign holdings only and does not include domestic positions.
In order to derive the foreign portfolio positions in the overall portfolio we need to retrieve the share of
foreign assets. To accomplish this objective we drew from Datastream (Thomson Financial) the stock market
capitalization of all country indexes and from the International Financial Statistics (IFS ) the outstanding
foreign equity portfolio investments and the corresponding liabilities. Accordingly we can derive the foreign
equity shareof country i at time t, FSit24
FSi;t =
(FA)i;t
(MCAPi;t + FAi;t   FLi;t) (9)
24Fidora et al. (2007) and Sorensen et al. (2007) follow the same procedure dealing with the CPIS dataset.
30
where FA stands for "foreign equity assets", FL for "foreign equity liabilities" and MCAP for "stock
market capitalization". After obtaining the foreign share FS it is possible to recover the share of each foreign
asset in the overall portfolio.
Foreign bond market portfolios
The same procedure applies to determine the foreign bond share. The outstanding foreign xed securities
portfolio investments and the corresponding liabilities are still drawn from the IFS while the source for bond
market capitalization is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Security Statistics containing data on
international debt securities by residence of issuer and domestic debt securities by residence of issuer of all
maturities and sectors. In our analysis short term and long term xed securities are pooled together. In
fact, in the CPIS dataset debt instruments are partly broken down by long-term debt and short-term debt,
with the latter being dened as debt securities with an original maturity of up to one year. However, not
all countries provide a breakdown of debt securities by maturity whereas they report the total value of debt
securities. Moreover, we cannot identify amounts outstanding of debt securities by original maturity, as the
BIS only provides a separate breakdown for debt securities with remaining maturity of up to one year.
Market share
Market shares refer to the values at the end of December of each year.
Source: Datastream, Thomson Financial
World oat portfolio
The world oat portfolio is a corrected value weighted portfolio obtained by multiplying the market share
by a fraction taking into account the fraction of closely held shares (Dahlquist et al. (2003)). We convert
our world market portfolio weights into world oat portfolio weights (Dahlquist et al. (2003), Table 2).
We keep the conversion coe¢ cient invariant over the time period considered being the fraction of country
closely-held shares quite stable over a short time horizon while the most important variability dimension, the
cross-sectional one, is properly taken into account.
B.2 Regressors
Proximity variables
Distance
The distance is measured as the Great Circle distance in miles between capital cities of source (l) and
destination (j) country. The average distance from a destination country (j) is obtained as weighted (by
market share) average of the distance of investing countries. The variable included in the regression is the
logarithm of the ratio of the distance l   j to the average distance.
Border dummy
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share a common
border (0 otherwise).
Language dummy
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share a common
language (0 otherwise)
Euronext dummy (Common Stock Exchange dummy)
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share the Euronext
stock exchange platform (0 otherwise). In our case, it coincides with a common stock exchange dummy since
the investing countries considered did not merge in a common stock exchange with other countries.
EMU dummy (Common Currency dummy)
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country are members of
the European Monetary Union (0 otherwise). In our case, it coincides with a common currency dummy since
do not belong to any other currency union.
Equal law
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the investing country and the destination country belong to the same
legal root, common law or civil law.
Legal origin
Identies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country: English, French,
German, Scandinavian. One of the four legal dummies must be dropped out of the analysis to avoid mul-
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ticollinearity and represents the benchmark origin (Scandinavian in our case). Due to perfect correlation
between the interaction common_law eq_law and the English origin this is also dropped from the analysis.
Creditor rights
An index aggregating creditor rights, following LLSV (1998). A score of one is assigned when each of
the following rights of secured lenders are dened in laws and regulations: 1) restrictions, such as creditor
consent or minimum dividends, for a debtor to le for reorganization; 2) secured creditors are able to seize
their collateral after the reorganization petition is approved, i.e. there is no automatic stay or asset freeze; 3)
secured creditors are paid rst out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt rm,as opposed to other creditors
such as government or workers; 4) management does not retain administration of its property pending the
resolution of the reorganization. The original index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong creditor
rights). Since we consider the variable in log form, to avoid problems when the argument is zero, we add one
unit to each score.
Shareholder rights
An index aggregating shareholder rights , following LLSV (1998). It is obtained combining the antidirector
rights index and the one share-one vote rule. A score of one is assigned when each of the following rights:
a) one share-one vote rule. Equals one if the company law or commercial code of the country requires
that ordinary shares carry one vote per share and zero otherwise. See LLSV (1998) for further details.
b) antidirector rights: measure how strongly the legal system favors minority shareholders against man-
agers or dominant shareholders in the corporate decision making process. This is an index formed by adding
one when (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote directly to the rm, (2) shareholders
are not require to deposit their shares prior to a shareholdersmeeting, (3) cumulative voting for directors or
proportional representation in the board is allowed, (4) an oppressed minority mechanism is in place, (5) the
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders
meeting is less than 10 percent, or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a
shareholdersvote. The original index ranges from zero to six, from zero to seven adding the one share-one
vote rule. Our shareholder rightsindex which combines antidirector rights and one share-one vote rule ranges
from 1 to 8 as we adopt a log specication.
Corruption index
ICRs assessment of the corruption in government. Scale from zero to 10, with lower scores for higher
levels of corruption (LLSV (1998)).
Expropriation risk
ICRs assessment of the risk of "outright conscation" or "forced nationalization". Scale from zero to 10
with lower scores for higher risk (LLSV (1998)).
Accounting rules
Index based on information disclosure and accounting practices (LLSV (1998)).
E¢ ciency of judicial system
Assessment of the "e¢ ciency and integrity of the legal environment as it a¤ects business, particularly
foreign rms" produced by Business International Corporation. Scale from zero to 10 with lower scores for
lower e¢ ciency level.
Ownership concentration
Average percentage of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non-
nancial, privately-owned domestic rms in a given country (LLSV (1998))
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